Supreme Court to Review Asylum Status Termination and Permanent Residency Eligibility

Why it matters locally: While there isn't a direct, immediate impact on Kentucky's key industries, the Supreme Court's decision on asylum status and permanent residency eligibility could influence the legal landscape for immigrants residing in Kentucky and the caseloads of federal immigration courts that serve the state.

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WASHINGTON – The Supreme Court is set to decide whether individuals whose asylum status has been terminated remain eligible for lawful permanent residency. The case, *Wassily v. Blanche*, centers on interpretations of the Refugee Act of 1980. The Refugee Act established the modern asylum system. While it provided detailed guidance for refugee processes outside the United States, the act offered less clarity on internal asylum procedures. This lack of clear statutory language has led to differing interpretations among federal courts, especially as asylum claims increased over time. Specifically, the act stated that refugees processed abroad could only obtain a permanent resident green card if their refugee "admission has not been terminated." However, for asylees within the United States seeking to adjust to permanent resident status under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), the act did not mention termination. It instead stated that an immigration official "may" grant a green card to "any alien granted asylum" who met admissibility requirements. The language did not specify whether "granted asylum" applied to those who previously received asylum or only those with current asylum status. One of the plaintiffs, Tamer Wassily, entered the United States from Egypt in 1993 and received asylum in 2000 as a Coptic Christian. Following convictions for stalking and child endangerment, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to terminate his asylum status. An immigration judge found his stalking conviction a "particularly serious crime" and terminated his asylum status. However, the judge also found him eligible for a green card, noting the statute lacked an "explicit requirement" for current asylum status. Byron Velasquez Arreaga, another plaintiff, entered the U.S. in 1995 and was granted asylum. After convictions for driving while intoxicated, the DHS moved to terminate his asylum status. An immigration judge terminated his asylum status due to serious crimes and concluded that he could not adjust to a green card without current asylum status, ordering his removal to Guatemala. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed the statutory ambiguity in *Matter of T-C-A-*, a precedent decision. The BIA interpreted the statute to mean that only individuals with current asylum status could adjust to permanent resident status. Relying on this, the BIA found both Wassily and Velasquez Arreaga ineligible for permanent residency due to their terminated asylum status. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed the BIA's position, aligning with other circuits. The 2nd Circuit determined that the phrase "granted asylum" in the statute required current asylum "status." The court cited the Immigration Act of 1990, which created a limited, time-restricted exception for some noncitizens to apply for green cards "regardless of whether or not such asylum has been terminated." The 2nd Circuit reasoned this specific exception did not create a general rule allowing permanent residency after termination. In dissent, Judge Beth Robinson argued that the asylee adjustment statute should apply to any noncitizen previously granted asylum, contending that the absence of the word "status" in the statutory provision was an intentional omission by Congress. Wassily and Velasquez Arreaga contend that the statutory text indicates that any noncitizen previously "granted asylum" can seek permanent residence even after termination. They interpret "granted" as a past tense verb and emphasize the omission of "status." They also reference Section 1159(c), which allows for a discretionary waiver of other admissibility requirements, arguing it would be unusual to eliminate this discretion when asylum status is terminated. They invoke the rule of lenity, suggesting statutory ambiguities should favor the noncitizen, particularly after *Loper Bright v. Raimondo*, which altered the standard for judicial deference to agency interpretations. Solicitor General D. John Sauer supported the Supreme Court's review of the case. He maintains that the 2nd Circuit correctly interpreted asylee adjustment as limited to individuals with current asylum status. The government argues that Congress intended to bar individuals with terminated asylum status from obtaining a green card, citing the 1990 Immigration Act's limited exception as evidence. The solicitor general disputes the applicability of the rule of lenity and argues that the discretionary waiver in Section 1159(c) does not undermine the interpretation of asylee adjustment. The Supreme Court's decision could affect numerous asylum applicants. The DHS announced in December 2025 that it would re-review asylum approvals from "high-risk" countries since 2021, with potential for status termination. A federal district court vacated this policy in June 2026, and the government is appealing that ruling. The case may also have implications for federal administrative law, depending on the justices' engagement with arguments about discretionary authority and the *Loper Bright* precedent.