Supreme Court Ruling in Landor v. Louisiana Shifts Focus to Federalism, Funding

Washington — The Supreme Court's recent decision in *Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections* centered on federalism and congressional funding powers, moving beyond initial expectations of a direct religious liberty ruling. The case, argued in November, concluded in late June, addressing the availability of personal money damages against state officials under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).

Previous Supreme Court terms frequently featured significant church-state or religious freedom cases. In 2021, the Court unanimously upheld a religious freedom claim in *Fulton v. City of Philadelphia*, though some justices expressed frustration at the Court's decision not to revisit the *Smith* doctrine. The 2022 term included *Kennedy v. Bremerton School District*, which saw the Court state it had abandoned the *Lemon* test. Last year, in *Mahmoud v. Taylor*, a majority affirmed parental rights to direct children's religious education, referencing the 1972 case of *Wisconsin v. Yoder*.

In *Landor*, the central question involved whether RLUIPA authorizes lawsuits for money damages against individual state officials who violate the statute. The Court had previously ruled unanimously that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), a similar federal law, authorized such lawsuits through shared language providing for "appropriate relief." Proponents argued that denying remedies in RLUIPA cases for prisoners could weaken the statute's effectiveness.

Damon Landor, a Rastafarian prisoner, sued a prison guard for allegedly violating his religious commitment to grow dreadlocks. Court documents indicate the guard handcuffed Landor and shaved his head despite awareness of Landor's religious practices and prior judicial rulings protecting them.

Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for the six-justice majority, concluded that RLUIPA does not permit personal money damages, unlike RFRA. Gorsuch cited Congress's "spending power" as the basis for RLUIPA, distinguishing it from RFRA. Laws based on spending power function as agreements, where the federal government attaches conditions to funds it distributes. The Court reasoned that RLUIPA's "deal" exists between Congress and state prisons, not with individual officials who do not receive federal funds directly.

This distinction relates to established constitutional principles regarding Congress's power to spend. While Congress can attach conditions to federal funds, as seen in *South Dakota v. Dole* where states received highway funds conditioned on raising the drinking age, the Court in *Landor* determined this leverage does not extend to individual state officials not party to the funding agreement.

The *Landor* decision also drew comparisons to *Sabri v. United States*, a 2004 case where the Court upheld a federal criminal prosecution for bribery against an individual whose actions affected a local government body receiving federal funds, even without direct proof of federal fund involvement. Gorsuch differentiated *Landor* by stating that Congress can punish those who undermine federal funds, but lawsuits against non-consenting parties do not achieve the same objective.

In July, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a local arson case from Arkansas to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit for further review in light of *Landor*, given the government's reliance on *Sabri* in that case.

The origins of RLUIPA also played a role in the Court's reasoning. In 1997, *City of Boerne v. Flores* held that RFRA exceeded Congress's power to enforce the 14th Amendment by imposing a more protective religious freedom rule than the Court deemed constitutionally required. Consequently, Congress relied on the spending power to enact RLUIPA, using a conditional funding approach rather than directly legislating against states. Both RFRA and RLUIPA arose from congressional dissatisfaction with the Court's 1990 *Employment Division v. Smith* ruling, which stated religious exemptions are not constitutionally required from generally applicable, non-discriminatory laws. Critics of *Smith* argue it reduced First Amendment protections for religious practices.

*Landor* began as a case concerning remedies under a religious liberty statute. It evolved into a discussion on the boundaries between federal and state authority, highlighting ongoing debates about the roles of courts and legislatures in religious freedom.